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Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will soon be a reality. The Amsterdam 
Summit has definitely adopted the institutional framework for the introduction of 
the euro on January 1,  1999. The time has come, therefore, to shift our attention 
from the legal and technical issues of  the transition to the more economic topic of 
the actual functioning of  monetary union. 
Since the publication of  One Market,  One Money in 1990, there has been intense 
academic debate on EMU.  This debate has  been extremely valuable,  shedding 
light on key policy matters. Over the years, the Directorate-General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs has both contributed to and benefited from  the academic 
discussion. As the date for the introduction of the euro approaches, we felt the 
need to reflect on this discussion so as to further our economic understanding of 
the opportunities and challenges offered by EMU. 
We proceeded in two directions. A number of seminars were organised, at which 
some fourteen distinguished academic economists participated. Simultaneously, a 
group  of about twenty DG II  economists were  asked to  elaborate papers  on a 
number of relevant policy issues.  These  papers  are  published as  two  separate 
Economic Papers.  The first Paper (Part A) presents a broad assessment of the 
economic debate on the functioning of  EMU. The second Paper (Part B) explores 
a number of  policy issues in greater detail. 
I hope that these two Economic Papers, which pave the way to further analytical 
work  by  DG  II,  will  bring  valuable  insights,  and  thereby  contribute  to  the 
elaboration of  appropriate policies for the successful functioning of  EMU. 
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directed by Giovanni Ravasio, Director-General, and coordinated by Herve Carre and 
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Marco  Buti and  Andre  Sapir are  the main contributors to  Part A and editors of the 
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On January 1st 1999, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will move to its third and 
final  stage.  The Euro will  become the single currency while national currencies will 
continue to exist for a transient period as subunits of the Euro.  The responsibility for 
monetary policy in the participating countries will be  entrusted to the  newly-created 
European Central Bank. 
European  monetary  union  must  be  understood  as  compns1ng  two  separate,  but 
complementary  facets:  a  single  currency,  and  a  stable  currency.  These  two  facets 
correspond to the two interrelated objectives of  EMU: efficiency and stability. 
The commitment by national  public  authorities  to  meet the  terms of the  Treaty  on 
European  Union  for  creating  EMU  is  already  bearing  important  fruit  in  terms  of 
stability:  in the  past  several  years,  the  convergence  towards  low inflation has  been 
impressive  and,  although  more  efforts  are  in  order,  budget  deficits  have  been 
substantially reduced.  This  has  resulted  in more  stable  nominal  exchange  rates  and 
lower long term interest rates, thus paving the way to the current economic recovery. 
Although EMU represents  first  and  foremost  a  monetary  policy regime  change,  its 
implications are much wider. The construction of EMU is geared towards the stability 
of  the new currency, and sound public finances. Together with a well-functioning Single 
Market, this new policy regime is bound to bring about a new economic environment 
with fundamental consequences for the behaviour of  public and private agents. 
The gradual elimination of budget deficits, as provided for by the Stability and Growth 
Pact, implies that government debt, currently still at too high levels, will be set on a 
consistently downward path. This will have beneficial consequences for interest rates 
and private investment, help restructuring public expenditure by giving more weight to 
growth-enhancing factors (such as investment in education and infrastructure), and raise 
the  room  for  manoeuvre  of national  budgetary  policies  in  stabilising  the  cycle. 
Budgetary discipline will also imply a new, fairer contract between the current and the 
next generation which will not have to shoulder the burden oftoday's spending choices. 
In total, with the change brought about by the EMU regime, the risk of a new stability 
conflict between the  monetary  and budgetary policies,  which  in  the  past repeatedly 
contributed  to  the  unsatisfactory  growth  and  employment  performance  of  the 
Community, could be avoided in the coming years. 
Private agents, as consumers and producers, will not only benefit from lower transaction 
costs and simplification entailed by the replacement of multiple national currencies by 
the euro, but will also see their spectrum of choice broadened. The euro will strengthen 
the  effects  of the  Single  Market  due  to  higher  price  transparency  and  greater 
competition. The relationship between factors of  production will also undergo important 
changes.  It will  become  apparent  that  if prices  and  wages  are  inconsistent  with 
macroeconomic stability and with the Single Market rules, there will not be a "bail out" by public authorities - be it in the form of  budgetary handout, looser monetary policy or 
"defensive" industrial policies. To the extent that wage and price behaviour anticipate 
this constraint, EMU will lead to a greater efficiency and higher employment. 
The changes in behaviour on the part of  public authorities and private agents in the new 
EMU regime are desirable per se, as a means of tackling the structural problems faced 
by  Europe,  namely  the  high  and  structural  unemployment  and  the  budgetary 
consequences of  ageing. Hence EMU acts as a catalyst of changes which would have to 
take place anyhow to shift the European economies on a path of sustainable growth and 
high employment. 
By  definition,  EMU  implies  the  loss  of national  monetary  autonomy.  One  of the 
criticisms often levied against the EMU project is that member countries will not be 
able to respond to economic disturbances via changes in national monetary policy or in 
their nominal exchange rate. It is then alleged that negative shocks will result in a surge 
of  unemployment. 
In reality, the exchange rate, being a "national" instrument- in that it changes the whole 
set of domestic prices vis-a-vis partner countries - is potentially appropriate only in a 
narrow set of circumstances, namely in the event of shocks affecting the entire national 
economy and only that economy. If  the shock only effects a particular region or sector, a 
devaluation would lead to over-heating in other parts of  the economy. Mutatis mutandis, 
the  same can be  said of monetary  policy.  Shocks that are  truly national  are  already 
relatively infrequent. And they will become even more so  once EMU is in place: The 
stability-oriented  macroeconomic  framework  will  reduce  the  likelihood  of policy-
induced shocks (such as disturbances originating in reckless fiscal behaviour), which in 
the  past  have  been  an  important  source  of country-specific  shocks.  Moreover,  the 
increasing trade interdependence among EMU members will further blur the economic 
importance of national boundaries,  thereby  reducing national specificity of economic 
developments. 
Admittedly, in those circumstances in which a change in the exchange rate or national 
monetary policy would have been useful, alternative adjustment channels will have to 
be provided for in EMU. 
At the macroeconomic level, a rapid reduction of deficits below the 3% threshold will 
create  sufficient  room  for  automatic  fiscal  stabilisers  to  offset  cyclical  downturns. 
Where  structural adjustment,  rather than mere  macro-economic  stabilisation is  called 
for,  changes in prices and wages will be needed. This requires that product and labour 
markets operate with greater flexibility. 
In conclusion, EMU offers important opportunities for  better allocation of resources, 
higher growth and higher employment, but also challenges of completing the necessary 
budgetary consolidation and  stepping up the  reforms  in product and labour markets. 
Meeting these challenges will ensure not only the full  success of EMU, but will also 
help in solving Europe's structural problems. 2) 
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ECONOMIC  POLICY  IN  EMU 
RULES AND ADJUSTMENT 
INTRODUCTION AND MAIN CONCIJUSIONS 
In a. little over one year, Econonlic and Monetary Union (EMU) will enter its third and 
final  phase.  As  the date of 1st January  1999 approaches,  the debate over European 
monetary unification is accelerating. The purpose of  the present paper is to review and 
assess the recent debate. This review is deliberately selective. It focuses entirely on the  .  . 
functioning  of the monetary union,  leaving  aside  the issues of transition tovv'ard  the 
third stage of  EMU, but includes son1e of  the questions associated with its early years. 
The  point  of departure  is  that  European  monetary  union .!must  be  understood  as 
comprising  two  separate,  but complementary facets:  a single  currency,  and  a  stable 
currency.  'I'hese  two facets  correspond to the  two  interrelated  objectives  of E~1U: 
efficiency and stability. 
Most of  the econotnic literature on European monetary unification centres on the issue 
of  efficiency, building on the theoretical concept of optimal currency areas (OCAs). In 
this context, economists have attempted to assess the gains and losses associated with 
the elimination of  separate national currencies in favour of  a single European currency. 
On the benefit side, a single currency is generally viewed as a necessary con1plen1ent to 
an efficient single European market, based on three argurrtents: 
First,  EU members  cannot obtain the full  gains  fron1  the  single  market unless 
they completely eliminate the exchange rate risks  and  conversion costs arising 
from  the  use  of separate  national  cun-encies.  This  view  'vas  most  forcet11lly 
presented  by  the  European Commission  (1990)  in  One  A1arket1  One  A1oney, 
which estimated that the transaction costs due to n1ultiple  currencies in the EU 
amounted to nearly 0. 5~-'0 of  EU GDP in the mid-1980s. A more recent study by 
the G·erman IFO institute puts this figure at 1  <yo for the nlid-1990s (see European 
Commission,  1996,  p.  85).  While  difficult  to quantify,  the  efficiency  costs  of 
resource misallocation due to exchange rate risk n1ay be considerably larger. -2-
Second, due to the abolition of capital controls in the EU  (a consequence of the 
single market project), these gains cannot be obtained sin1ply  by fixing  bilateral 
exchange rates between national currencies. This opinion was already expressed 
a decade ago by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, when he warned  against trying to 
pursue an 
4'inconsistent quartet" of policy  objectives in Europe:  tree trade,  fu11 
capital  tnobility,  fixed  exchange  rates,  and  independent  national  tnonetary 
policies. He argued that "the only solution to the inconsistency is to con1plen1ent 
the internal market vvith a monetary union" (Padoa-Schioppa, 1988, p.  376). 
Finally,  the complementarity between monetary union and  trade integration is 
based  not  only  on efficiency  considerations,  but  also  on "political  economy" 
arguments.  The  argument  is  that,  given  the  extent of cornpetition in the  EU, 
currency fluctuations strongly affect competitive positions, giving tise to political 
charges of con1petitive depreciation and exchange dumping which could trigger 
protectionist responses.  Therefore,  currency fluctuations,  if allowed to persist, 
could severely endanger the Single Market. 
On the cost side,  the OCA literature points to the problems that may be encountered 
by  tnembers  of the European  Monetary  Union  in  the  absence  of the  exchange  rate 
instrument if  they suffer country-specific n1acro-economic disturbances. Two principal 
issues are raised: 
First, research has attempted to examine the potential implications of EMlJ for 
the occurrence of country-specific  shocks.  There are clear indications that the 
likelihood  of truly  national  shocks  will  be  lessened  by  E1vfU.  In  addition, 
diverging  macro-economic  behaviours  have  often  been  the  result  of 
uncoordinated policy responses to conunon shocks, which will  pattly disappear 
with ElVfU.  Therefore,  instances in which the exchange  rate  instrument is  the 
appropriate tool tbr responding to macro-economic disturbances are limited  in 
the case of  ElJ  ~1ernber States. 
A  second issue relates to the existence of alternative mechanisms for absorbing 
the  remaining  country-specific  shocks  once  national  authorities  have  lost 
monetruy independence.  The probletn is  viewed  as  especially acute given that, 
contrary to the United States or other federated entities, the EU budget will not 
be able to help cushion shocks incurred by individual Men1ber States.  There are 
hvo such potentjal ntechanisms: 
•  The tlrst  is  the functioning  of product and  labour markets.  There is  broad 
agreentent in the economic literature that many aspects of  product and labour 
markets in ElJ Member States are currently insufficiently flexible.  However, 
additional adjustment in n1arket structure and response is likely to etnerge as 
an  endogenous  consequence  of the  Single  Market  and  the  new  monetary 
regime. But these changes will emerge only gradually in the new regime.  This 
is  acknowledged  in  the  Comnussion's Action Plan for the  Single  Market, -3-
which  seeks  to  improve  the  perforn1ance  of product  markets  in  the  years 
ahead as "'the third stage of EMlJ represents a critical juncture, at which the 
Single  Market  ·will  provide  underlying  support  for  Monetary  Union" 
(European Commission, 1997  a). 
•  The  second  mechanisn1  involves  tax-smoothing  and  automatic-stabilisation 
provided by national budgets.  In this context,  n1uch  has been ,written about 
the  Excessive  Deficit  Procedure and  the  Stability  and  Growth Pact.  It  has 
been argued that these budgetary discipline procedures tnay severely limit the 
functioning of  national autotnatic stabilisers, thereby entailing significant costs 
for EMU members in the event of country-specific disturbances.  In fact,  the 
opposite holds.  The sharp increases in budget deficits  and  government debt 
over  the  1980s  and  1990s  in  many  EU countries  have  created  structural 
imbalances  which  prevent  the  actual  operation of autotnatic  stabilisers.  In 
these circun1stances,  the Stability  and  GrO'wth  Pact will  help  to restore the 
rootn  for  manoeuvre  needed  by  national  goverrunents  to  engage  in  tax-
stnoothing activities. l'he fiscal consolidation required to regain such room for 
tnanoeuvre  need  not  be  recessionary.  Positive  expectational  effects  tnight 
reduce the standard negative Keynesian effect. Accordingly, episodes of fiscal 
retrenchment need not trigger an economic slowdown, especia11y if  they occur 
around spending cuts, rather than tax increases.  Furthermore, in a situation 
where price  stability has been broadly achieved,  it  is  possible for  the direct 
restraining effects of budgetary consolidation to be broadly offset by  easier 
n1onetary policies and better financial conditions. 
As  already  alluded  to,  the  OCA literature  does  not  deal  with  the  second  facet  of 
European n1onetary union, natnely stability of  the comn1on currency, the euro. There is 
broad agreement in the economics literature in favour of price stability,  the pritnary 
objective assigned by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) to the European Central 
Bank (ECB). However, there is son1e debate on the n1echanisms designed by the TEU 
in order to achieve the objective of  price stability. These mechanisn1s concern both the 
monetary policy of  the Union and the fiscal policy of  the J\t1:etnber States. 
The Treaty offers strong guarantees for stability-oriented monetary policy.  Several of 
its  provisions ensure the independence  of the ECB,  a feature  commonly  vievved  as 
necessary for credibility, which is in tum required for price stability.  These provisions 
concern the  status of the Bank's board  men1bers  as  well  as  the  prohibition  on the 
ESCB from. engaging in "monetary t1nancing" of  otlicial entities. 
The  Treaty  also  contains  fiscal  provtstons,  in  particular  the  Excessive  Deficit 
Procedure, which are meant in large measure to reinforce the credibility of  the ECB in 
pursuing its primary objective of price stability.  The logic of the Treaty's budgetary 
rules is that high debts and deficits threaten the stability of the euro because they n1ay 
lead to debt runs, thereby putting pressure on the ECB to bail out countries in financial 
distress.  The Excessive Deficit Procedure (together  with  the attendant  Stability  and 
Growth Pact) offers the distinct advantage of a mechanistn designed to prevent, rather -4-
than cure, financial crises. As such, it forms an important part of the apparatus aimed 
at ensuring price stability inside the euro area. 
The monetary and fiscal rules in El\1U are  like1y to have a favourable effect on growth 
and en1ployment, essentially via two mechanisms: a stable macro-econonlic framework 
should  result  in  lo\ver  and  less  variable  interest  rates,  with  positive  effects  on 
investment  and  consumption;  a  credible  environment  of price  stability  should  also 
affect the behaviour of socia1  partners,  giving  rise  to ern.ployment-compatible  wage 
behaviour. 
The remarkable nominal convergence achieved by EU Mentber States indicates that 
the  stability  objective  of EMlJ is  becoming  a  reality.  On  average  for  the  period 
September '96 - Auf,Jtlst  '97, the inflation rate in the 15  countries of the EU was I.  9 
~lo, lower than at any point in the past 3 5 years. Except for Greece, all Member States 
had inflation rates below 3'%.  By contrast, as recently as 1991, average inflation in the 
EU  stood at  5 °/o,  with five  Member  States above 6%.  Over the twelve months to 
August '97, the average long-term interest rate 'vas 6.5 %, 'vith rates at no more than 
7.5 % in all  countries except Greece.  By con1parison,  in  1991, the average rate was 
around  10%, \Vith five  countries above  11  ~fo.  Great progress has also  been achieved 
regarding general govenunent budgetary positions.  In 1996,  the average deficit was 
4.3% of GDP,  as cotnpared with 6.5% in  1993, with the majority of Member States 
above the 3% n1ark. 
In conclusion, European monetary union offers opportunities, but also challenges. The 
opportunities are twofold. First, the single currency will increase the efficiency of  the 
Sing]e Market. Second, EMU \vill amount to a new economic regime characterised by 
price  stability  and  sound  public  finances.  This  new  macro-economic  fratnework  is 
already  largely  in  place,  and  should  yield  positive  returns  in  terms  of growth and 
employment. The challenges are also twofold. On one hand, the smooth functioning of 
the macro-economic framework  wi11  require the correct mix  bet,veen  monetary and 
fiscal  policies,  especially  during  the  early  years  of  EMU_  On  the  other,  the 
opportunities offered by E:MU will only be fully reaped if product and labour markets 
are made to operate more efficiently.  In reality, the challenges are largely independent 
of EMU as they stem from  the basic objectives of competitiveness and employment 
creation faced  by EU  Member States.  Monetary union tnerely acts  as  a "facilitating 
device'' for tackling these inevitable challenges. 
In its steady state, EMlJ is likely to be characterised by  price stability,  sound public 
finances,  and well-functioning product and labour n1arkets.  What will be the situation 
at the beginning of stage three? The provisions of the Treaty and the noted nominal 
convergence ensure that monetary policy \viH deliver price stability right from the start. 
The  goal  of sound  public  finances  will  have  been  reached  by  all  participants  in 
n1onetary  union,  but the  degree  of fulfilment  is  likely  to vary  across  members.  In 
particular, many of  the participants are likely to need to make more progress in order 
to reach a budget close to balance or in  surplus.  Finally,  not all  markets will operate -5-
efficiently  at  the  outset.  Many  goods markets  already  operate  fairly  efficiently.  By 
contrast, service and labour markets are still generally hampered by nutnerous barriers. 
* 
*  * 
This paper reviews the economic debate surrounding both the opportunities and the 
challenges arising from European monetary union. It is organised in two parts. Part I 
examines the economic environment in  E:tvfU,  analysing the role of markets and  the 
tnacro-economic framework. It finds that the prospect of  EM~U  has already succeeded 
in creating a stable macro-econotnic environn1ent, but that structural reforms aimed at 
better functioning markets take more time to be implemented and to produce results. 
Part II investigates the issue of adjustment in  EMU in response to  rnacro-economic 
disturbances,  exploring the potential contribution of market mechanisn1s  and macro-
economic policies for coping \Vith country-specific shocks. It  finds that the new macro-
economic framework will  soon enable automatic stabilisers to operate better than in 
the recent past, but that it may take longer for market mechanisms  to  play thejr full 
part. -6-
I.  THE ECONOMIC POLICY FRAME\VORK OF EMU 
The  impact of EMlT  will  go  far  beyond  the  change  of monetary  regime.  It will 
profoundly affect the behaviour of econon1ic agents, public as ':veil  as private.  By  all 
accounts, European n1onetary union will amount to a structural break, altering tnarket 
structures  and  policy  processes.  Price stability  and  sound public  finances  are  both 
criteria for joining and permanent features of El\ill. The EMU environn1ent will also 
require better functioning tnarkets. EMU wil1 have important external implications. 
A..  PRICE STABILITY 
The benefits of  price stability 
It is widely recognised that inflation imposes a cost on society. Jn assessing the benefits of 
price stability, a classic distinction is drawn between anticipated and unanticipated inflation. 
In the case of perfL:x,ily anticipated inflation, the latter represents a tax on holding money 
and forces  agents  to  increase  the frequency  of cash  withdrawal  fron1  the bank  ('shoe 
leather' costs) and imposes costs of  changing price listings ('menu' costs) on enterprises. 
The effects of 'surprise' inflation are much mote serious
1




a)  inflation  leads  to  arbitrary  redistribution  of income  and  \vealth,  in  particular,  from 
creditors to debtors, from fixed-income earners (essentially workers) to capital owners, 
frotn current debt-holders to thture tax-payers. 
b)  in a situation of  high inflation, there is a tendency tbr certain long-tem1 financ.ia1  markets 
to shrink  (e.g.  fixed-interest  mortgages).  A  related  outcome is  a  strong bias  in  the 
financial  stn1cture of enterprises towards borrovving,  rather than capital raising,  '"-'lith 
negative effects on financial stability and competitiveness. 
c)  high inflation goes hand in hand vvith increased variability of  both aggregate price level 
and relative prices. The higher ptice level uncertainty would impose a risk premium on 
interest rates - in  turn resulting in lower investtnent - and con1plicate the conduct of 
n1acroeconomic policy. Relative price uncertainty blurs the informational content of  the 
price system 'vith a negative impact on the allocation of  resources. Both elements have 
nega:tive efiects on output. 
d) as a result of  the above efiects, one 'votlld expect a negative relationship between output 
growth and inflation. On the basis of  a panel of  around 100 countries in the period 1960-
2 
In  practice,  however,  the  distinction  between  anticipated  and  unanticipated  inflation  partly  loses 
significance. in that all the conditions to neutralise the effa.."ts of inflation bouts are not fulfilled in the 
real world, even in the ex1reme case of fully anticipated inflation. 
For recent surveys on the subject, see Briault (1995), Th1F (1996) and Mishkin and Posen (1997). -7-
90,  and  after controJling for  several  other growth detenninants,  Barro  (1996) finds  a 
significant negative correlation. 
3 
e)  while the costs of moderate inflation- say,  below  10~-'0 a year - have been difficult to 
detect  in the growth literature,  there  are  grounds to  believe  that  they  may  be  n1ore 
important than usually thought.  In a recent paper,  Martin Feldstein (Feldstein,  1996) 
estimates that the benefits of  moving towards price stability front relative1y low inflation 
rates are substantial, once the distorting effects of a nominalist tax system on resource 
allocation are taken into account. He concludes that reducing the inflation rate from  4~/o 
to 2% in the US would lead to an annual gain ofbetween 0.7 and 1.6 per cent ofGDP. 
ECB independence and credibility 
A high degree of  price stability represents both an entry criterion and a permanent feature 
of  the monetary environntent in EMU. Ensuring that goal, thereby consolidating the culture 




According to  the mandate of Art.  105  of the Treaty,  the primary task of the ECB  is "to 
maintain  price  stability''.  As  pointed  out  by  von  H-agen  (  1996), 
4'this  mandate  is  much 
stronger and narrower than the mandate of Gennany' s Bundesbank whose principle task 
(  ... )is to 'safeguard the currency"' (von Hagen,  1996,  p.  1).  To the extent that the price 
stability  objective  is  not jeopardised,  the  ECB  is  ca11ed  upon  to  support  the  general 
econonuc policies in the Community. In order to fulfil its tnission, the ECB is provided with 
an independent status by the Treaty. 
A large  body  of entpirica1  literature  has  established  that,  in  the  case  of industrialised 
countries,  a higher degree of independence goes  hand in hand with lower inflation
5
.  The 
degree of correlation is strong especially for the  1970s and  1980s.  This  suggests that an 
independent central bank may provide the appropriate response to the kind of  inflationary 
shocks that hit the western economies in the 1970s and help prontote a cu]ture of  monetruy 
stability, as in the 1980s. 
How independent will the ECB be? 
4 
The correlation becontes statistically insignificant for inflation mtes below 20%.  However,  as Barro 
points  out,  "the  results  indicate  that  there  is  not  enough  information  in  the  low-inflation 
experiences to isolate precesely the effects of  inflation on grm\1h, but do not necessarily mean that 
this effect is sma11 at low rates of inflation  .. .In particular the data would not reject the hy--pothesis 
that the relation between growth and inflation is negative at low rates of inflation and of the sante 
magnitude as for higher rates of  inflation" (Barro, 1996, p. 57). 
The Treaty draws  a  distinction between the tasks  of the European  System  of Central  Banks 
(ESCB) and those of the European Central Bank (ECB).  The  form~r includes the ECB  and the 
national central banks of the EMU participants. Given the general stance of  the analysis hereafter, 
this paper. for simplicity. only refers to the ECB as an all-embracing body. 
See.  Cukierrnan  (1992)  and  Alesina  and  Summers  (1993).  A  summary  of the  e"idence  is 
presented in IMF (1996). For dissenting voices, see Barro (1996) and Jenkins (1996). -8-
In  assessing the degree of independence of a central bank,  a fundamental distinction has 
been rnade between  'goal independence)  and  'insttutnent independence'.  A central  bank 
which  can  set  its  o'"n :final  target  has  goal  independence,  while  it  has  instrument 
independence if  it controls the levers of  monetary policy
6
. 
On both counts,  the ECB  is  high-scoring.  It has  the  freedom  on the  rnonetary  policy 
instruments to pursue price stability, bound only by the principle of  respecting n1arket laws. 
It  can set its ovvn inflation goal, consistent with the requirement of  price stability. The EMI, 
in  its  report  on the  single  tnonetary  policy  in  Stage  Three  (EJVIJ,  1997),  has  already 
indicated that the ECB will announce publicly a quantified definition of  price stability. 
The whole framevvork of  the Treaty implies that the degree of  independence of  the ECB is 
probably the highest of  any other central bank in the world: 
•  the legal provisions on independence en1bodied in the Treaty (from the prohibition for 
the ECB to take or seek instructions frotn other bodies to the long term appointment 
and no possibility of  renewal of  Board n1embers) are very strong; 
•  the constitutional character of  those rules and the need to gather unaninlity of  Member 
States and  Parliamentary ratification to change them,  shelter ECB independence from 
virtually any attempt at dilution~ 
•  the budgetary constraints on government deficits and debt and the "no bail-out" clause 
strengthen the credibility of  legal provisions (see below). 
A  strong independent status,  however,  does  not automatically  translate into  higher 
anti-inflationary credibility.  The experience of certain central banks having acquired a 
high  degree  of independence  to  fight  inflation  (e.g.  N-ew  Zealand)  sho,vs  that 
disinflation n1ay still prove costly in terms of  foregone output. 
The  ECB  \vi1l  have  to  earn  its  anti-inflationary  credibility  vis-a-vis  the  markets. 
Therefore,  it is  often argued that at  the beginning of Stage Three,  the ECB would 
conduct an over-restrictive monetary policy in order to quickly establish a  'hawkish' 
reputation. It is further argued that the likelihood of such behaviour by the ECB is 
greater the larger the size of  monetary union, due to the perceived weakness of certain 
participants. 
However, this threat is  likely to be overrated. First of all,  the inflation entry criteria 
ensures a high degree of  price stability as from  the outset of Stage Three.  Second, the 
ECB  will  build  upon  the  strong  anti-inflationary  cotnmitment  by  central  banks 
throughout the EU, \vhich clearly signals that nowadays there is no difference in the 
weight attributed to inflation in their objective function.  Therefore, the benefits of the 
investment in anti-inflationary reputation built over the past several years are expected 
to be inherited by the ECB~  whatever the initial con1position ofEMtJ. 
6  See,  Fischer  (1995).  The  two  types  of  independence  are  also  referred  to  as  'political' 
independence  and  'economic'  independence  (Grilli  et  al.,  1991).  In  the  two  strands  of the 
literature on central bank independenc,  Rogoff (1995)'s  conservative  central banker has both 
types  of independence.  In  the  principal~agent approach  of Persson  and Tabellini  (1993),  the 
central bank (agent) has instrument independence, but the government (principal) sets the goal. (3) 
-9-
Yardstick for price stability 
As pointed out above, the Treaty does not provide a definition of  price stability.  Should it 
be interpreted literally as  zero inflation (if not price level  stability altogether) or could  a 
certain range of  low intlation also be compatible with the price stability objective? 
A number of  arguments have been put forward against trying to enforce zero inflation. Due 
to failure to take 'quality improven1ents' in goods and services fully into account, available 
indices may overstate actual inflation.  To the extent that nominal interest rates cannot be 
negative, a positive inflation rate allows negative real interest rates, which n1ay be helpful in 
pronounced  economic  downturns  (the  so-called  Sunnners  effece).  Furthennore,  a zero 
inflation increases the likelihood of  actual deflation in the event of a negative shock, with 
potentially disruptive consequences on financial stabi1ity
8
. 
More generally, it has beert aq,JUed that the Phillips curve may become substantially flatter 
at very low inflation rates. If  the frequency of price adjustment depends negatively on the 
rate of  inflation, the responsiveness of  prices to shocks is lower at very ]ow inflation rates. 
Second,  if nominal  wages  are  assumed  to  be  inflexible  downward,  a  positive  rate  of 
inflation 'vould allow a lowering of  real wages in the event of a shock. Finally,  as inflation 
variability tends to be lower at low inflation  rates,  price  changes  are  more  likely  to be 




Does the  above  reasoning imply that a relatively  high  rate  of inflation  is  necessary  for 
'greasing' the economy's wheels?  The  answer  is  no. The  benefits  of price  stability  listed 
above would be eroded with a higher inflation rate.  The higher unce1tainty about inflation 
would contribute to setting 'vages at a non-market clearing level, thereby reducing output 
and  employment.  Furthermore,  experience  shows  that  it  n1ay  be  difficult  to  stabilise 
inflation at re)atively high levels due to expectationally-driven inflation spirals in the event 
of  shocks. 
The conclusion is that a. positive, but low inflation should be the goal of monetary policy. 
The EMI has indicated that there has been  a broad consensus amongst central banks tor 
several  years  that  a  range  of 0%-2%,  inflation  per  annunl  is  an  appropriate  goal  for 
1nonetary policy (E:MI, 1997). This range would allo'v so1newhat diversified inflation rates. 
In federal  states,  such  as  Germany  and  the  US,  regional  differences  in  inflation  can  be 
significant.  ln Germany,  for  instance,  differences  of over  0. 5°/o  points  can  be  observed 
between the four  tnajor  regions  of former  West  Gern1any.  As  recalled  by  von Hagen 
( 1996), in the case of  the US, the consumer price index rose by 31.5 per cent between 1985 
and  1.991  in the Northeast Region,  but by only  24  per cent in the Southern Region.  To 
some extent these variations stem frotn differences in consumption goods baskets. 
8 
9 
See Smruners (1991). 
This risk has been emphasised by Bernanke and Mishkin ( 1997). 
The first two arguments, which have a New Ke)nesian flavour, have been put fmward by Ballet 
al. (1988) and Akerlofet al. (1996). The third argument is found in the classic Lucas (1973). -10-
One can reasonably expect that regional inflation differences "\\oil]  be more pronounced in 
E:tv1U,  as  the  EMlT-area  will  comprise  several  econotnies  in  \vhich  GDP  per head  is 
considerably  below  the  Ell-average.  In  these  so-called  "catching-up''  countries, 
productivity, in particular in truu1ufacturing, is likely to grow faster than in the other EMU-
countries.  Stronger productivity growth in manufacturing - the traded goods sector - may 
lead to higher \vage increases without affecting output prices. If  wage increases spill over to 
the  services  sector - generally  producing  non-traded  goods,  with a  lower  productivity 
gro\"V1h - its output prices are likely to rise.  Therefore one can expect a relatively higher 
inflation  rate  in  a  catching-up  economy  than  in  the  euro-zone  average  (the  so-called 
Balassa-Samuelson effect). 
The conduct of monetary policy 
How should  the  ECB  conduct monetary policy in stage three of EMlJ? Amongst  the 
several possible monetary strategies,  the EMI has retained two,  n1onetary targeting and 
inflation targeting (E:MI,  1997). 
Both strategies have adepts in the real world, although there is a noticeable shift towards 
the second. The Bundesbank \vas the first central bank to adopt monetary targets after the 
collapse ofBretton Woods and nowadays Germany remains, together with Switzerland, the 
only  country committed to such  strategy (von I-Iagen,  1995).  Since  the  early  1990s,  a 
nun1ber of  countries (namely, N·ew Zealand, Canada, O:K Australia, Sweden, Finland and 
Spain) shifted to a direct inflation targee
0
. 
The first  strategy  selects  a  monetary  aggregate  as  the  intennediate  target  of monetary 
policy. The properties of  an efficient intennediate target are a high co1relation with the fmal 
objective, controllability by the tnonetary authorities, and the ability to affect expectations. 
To what extent do monetary aggregates satisfy these requirements? 
Estrella and Mishkin (1996), looking at the behaviour of  monetary aggregates in  the US 
and Germany since the end of the  1970s,  draw a negative conclusion:  frequent  velocity 
shifts alter the relationship between money growth and nominal income and,  whatever the 
informationa1  content  of monetaty  aggregates  in  ear1ier  periods,  they  do  not  seem  to 
provide adequate and consistent infonnation at present.  However, as pointed out by von 
Hagen (1996), the choice of  the appropriate intermediate target is not detennined by the 
stability of the den1and for money per se,  but by the relative stability of the demand for 
money and  that of a1ternative  intetmediate  target vis-il-vis  the final  objective,  inflation. 
Therefore,  monetary targeting  may  still  be  useful.  As  at the  beginning  of Stage Three 
(because of portfolio shifts) broad money is likely to be more unstable than transactions 
demand  for  n1oney,  von Hagen suggests that the  ECB  should  retain  a narrow money 
aggregate as intermediate target.  This may still be subject to the we11-known Goodhart-
critique which implies that once targeted previously stable tnonetary aggregates tend to 
become tmstable. 
10  The experience with monetary and inflation targeting is  surveyd in  See Estrella  and Mishkin 
(1996), Almeida and Goodhart (1996), Bemanke and :Mishkin (1997). - 11-
Everything considered,  the main  advantage of adopting monetary targeting appears to be 
the continuity of  tnonetary conduct in EMU with that of the anchor country in the ERl\tL 
This may help inherit Bundesbank's anti-inflationary reputation. However, in the event of 
instability of  monetary aggregates, the ultimate question is whether the newly-created ECB 
Vvil1 be able to 'atford' to exceed the announced targets without jeopardising its credibility. 
The alternative option is direct inflation targeting.  Some of  the countries that etnbraced an 
inflation target in  recent  years  did  so  after  being  disillusioned  with fonnal  intennediate 
targets
11
.  Such  shift  took  place,  in  some  cases,  in  paraUel  ·with  conferring  a  higher 
independence  on  the  central  bank.  As  stressed  by  Mishkin  and  Posen  (1997),  if the 
announcement is credible,  an inflation target may  represent  a useful  device  for  affecting 
expectations and influencing price and wage setting. Ho,vever,  since inflation behaviour is 
not under the perfect control of  the rnonetary authorities, inflation targets rnay be exceeded 
in the event of  shocks, with a possible negative in1pact on central bank credibility. 
Under inflation targeting, the central bank has to choose whether to target a price-level 
path or an  inflation-rate path.  While  the latter  a1lovvs  for  base  drift,  the  former  doesn't 
(therefore  higher -than-targeted  inflation  rates  in  certain  periods  will  have  to  be 
compensated  by  lower-than-targeted  rates  in  subsequent  periods).  The  inflation  rate 
fluctuates more in the short-run under price-level targeting,  as n1onetary authorities strive 
to get back to the price-level path,  while it is  more  stabJe in the long-run
12
.  In  practice~ 
however, in the real world, there are no examples of  monetruy regimes adopting an explicit 
or in1plicit price level targeting
13
. 
While in the literature,  there is often a strong dichotonty between n1onetary targeting and 
inflation targeting, the actual differences between the two strategies are less acute.  Jndeed, 
as  stressed  by  Aln1eida  and  Goodhart ( 1996),  the real  difference  is  between pursuing  a 
publicly  announced inflation objective  and  a purely  discretionary  policy,  the latter being 
characterised by the well-known Barro-Gordon inflation bias. 
This 'quasi-equivalence' conclusion is strengthened by d1e analysis of  the actual behaviour 
of monetary  targeters.  What  does  the  Bundesbank  'really'  target,  beyond  official 
announcements? von 1-Iagen ( 1995) argues that inflation targets are a central ingredient in 
Bundesbank  strategy  and  the  monetary  target  is  never  regarded  as  absolute.  Similru·ly, 
Bernanke and  ~1ihov (1996) show that by holding constant the current inflation forecast, 
the Bundesbank responds very little to changes in forecasted money gro'"ih. As such it is 
best described as an  ~implicit' inflation targeter or a 'hybrid' case
14
. 
11  Svensson (1996a)  shows that inflation targeting corresponds with selecting  the  central bank's 
inflation forecast as an intermediate target. 
12  However,  Svensson  (1996b)  obtains  the  opposite  result  in  a  model  with  unemployment 
persistence. 
13  See, however, the ne.xi footnote. 
14  Moreover,  von Hagen (1995)  shows  that,  occasionally,  in the  past  20  years,  the  Bundesbank 
shifted from. an i11tlation  target to a price level target. to prevent pronounced, discrete jumps in 
the price level to translate into higher inflation expectations. thus triggering a cost-push inflation. - 12-
This 'eclectic' view of  the conduct ofmonetruy policy is confinned by the E!\1I (1997). The 
report recognises that,  "in practice,  central banks following  a monetary strategy adopt a 
tnore flexible approach (and) the difference between monetary and inflation targeting are 
not  overwhelming".  Furthermore,  given the likely  instability  of money aggregates in the 
early years ofE!\1U, the ECB \vi11 have to rely on a Jarger set of  variables in assessing the 
monetary  stance.  Fina1ly,  having  decided to  ntake  public  a quantified  definition  of price 
stability, in the event of  conflict between monetary developments and the inflation goal, the 
ECB is likely to give priority  to the latter. 
Transmission of ntonetary policy 
Monetruy po1icy aims to achieve its ultimate goal, price stability, by exerting an influence 
on  price  expectations  and  economic  activity.  The  differences  in  n1onetary  policy 
instruments and in financial structure between the tv1ember States mean that the speed and 
impact of monetary policy on the behaviour of economic agents differs from country to 
country. These differences could affect the effectiveness of  monetary policy in EMU. 
As each national Central Bank has its own set of tnonetary policy instruments, based on 
national preferences and tradition, there are already considerable differences in the impact 
the policy instnunents have on money market rates. These can be attributed to a different 
use of  reserve requiretnents, discount window, Lon1bard rate, etc. 
The struc..ture of  the financial system may influence the impact of  money market rates on 
the cost of credit.  As there is no  petfect substitution between financial  assets and bank 
loans/deposits,  one of the factors that plays a role is the share of  bank intermediation in 
credit to the private sector (or its complement, the degree of  securitisation of  credit). Also 
the degree of  competition in the banking sector has an impact on the speed at which policy 
rate increases are passed through. 
The  impact  of the  market  and  lending  rates  on  econonlic  activity  depends  on various 
factors,  such as the maturity structure of debt,  including public debt,  the adjustability of 
interest rates, the type of  assets held,  regulations, etc. Kneeshaw (1995),  while admitting 
the  risk  of oversitnplification,  identifies  two  groups  of countries.  In  the  first  group, 
households hold 1nainly shares and housing,  leading to ll:nportant wealth effects,  and the 
impact of  policy rates on the average rates paid on debt is relatively fast and large. In the 
other group,  home  ownership  is less widespread  and household financial wealth largely 
takes the fom1 of debt claims. Wealth effects and cash-flow constraints tend therefore to 
re1nain limited. 
Differences  in  the  sectoral  compostt1on  of output  may  also  affect  the  transrntsston 
mechanisn1, to the extent that they entail a different capital intensity of  production and thus 
influence the financial structure of  firn1s. 
Once in E!\1U, if the impact and speed of transmission of tnonetary policy vary between 
the Men1ber States, it may have an itnpact on the effectiveness of the ECB's policy and 
even lead to adverse reactions if  the effect on den1and is weaker in those regions where 
inflationary pressures are the strongest. -13-
The establishment of the ECB  and  consequent use of a  single  set of tnonetary  policy 
instruments in all participating Member States will automatically elin1inate any differences 
in the transmission mechanisn1 fron1 policy rates to money n1arket rates. Differences in the 
other parts of  the transmission mechanisms are not likely to disappear swiftly. There \\rill, 
however, be some pressure for the financial  structures of the private sector to converge. 
The prospect of price stability is likely to induce a lengthening debt tnaturity.  As  Borio 
(1995) has shown, countries that have enjoyed historically low inflation rates tend to have 
a higher share of  medium and long-tetm instruments. The current low interest rates, which 
are an incentive for lengthening the maturity of  debt, will facilitate the convergence of  the 
transmission mechanism. The latter could also be enhanced by policy rnea~ures. 
B.  SOUND PUBLIC FINANCES 
The benefits of budgetary discipline 
Maintaining budgetary discipline in stage three of EMlJ is an itnportant condition to 
underpin the stability of the single currency and allow a more favourable policy nux. 
The positive effects of sound public finances, which go beyond the question of EMU, 
can be summarised as follows: 
a)  a sound fiscal policy,  by allowing a reduction in interest rates and "crowding in" 
private investment, wiJI  lead to higher growth of the capital  stock in  the m.edium 
and long run. This will help to shift the economy onto a higher growth path and, by 
reducing the scarcity of capital, will be reflected in permanently low real interest 
rates.  Since EMU has  an  important  weight  in the international  economy,  these 
developments  will  help  bling  about  ]ow  interest  rates  world-wide,  thereby 
contributing to step up growth at the global level. 
b) by fostering low and stable inflationary expectations, low budget deficits and debts 
will  help  maintain  stable  prices.  They  wil1  a]so  reduce  the  likelihood  or  the 
economic costs of a  market test of the anti-inflationary  credibility  of the newly 
established ECB. 
c) increasing public saving is irn.portant in order to face the budgetary consequences of 
demographic  developments.  The  ageing  of  the  population  and  the  rise  in 
dependency ratios will inevitably put a heavy burden on social spending, which will 
be only partly compensated by the likely spreading of  private pension schemes. - 14-
d) fiscal discipline, by curbing public debt ratios and hence reducing the interest burden 
on public debt, \vill  allow the restructuring of governn1ent  spending by devoting a 
higher share of  public n1oney to political and economic priorities such as education 
and infrastructure investment. 
e)  lower deficit  and  debt  levels  create more  roo1n  to  cope with adverse  economic 
events.  This is true in general.  But, as will be argued in Part II, this is particularly 
itnportant  once  the  single  currency  is  in  place  because  the  accotnmodation  of 
country-specitlc shocks will then to a higher degree rest with budgetary policy. 
The  commitment  to  budgetary  discipline,  as  en1bodied  in  the  Treaty  on  European 
Union,  foresees  reference values  of 3(%  for  the  deficit  and  60~'0 for  the  debt,  both 
tneasured against GDP. 
Budgetary discipline: national and EMU perspective 
Budgetary discipline is important both fron1 a purely national perspective and for EMU 
as  a  ·whole.  While  "political  economy"  considerations  dominate  the  national 
perspective, international spillovers explain the need for discipline at the E:tvflJ level. 
Il1e national perspective 
The accent that the Treaty puts on tlscal discipline finds its roots in the recognition that 
the deterioration of  public finances in Europe in the last hventy five years needed to be 
stopped and reversed before ending up in an 'unsustainability trap' and a crowding-out 
of  investJnent. 
A "political econon1y'' interpretation of the l\1aastricht criteria is that ~1en1ber States, 
having become increasingly aware of the unsustainable nature of their public finances, 
have  decided to tie their own hands vis-a-vis  domestic public  opinions  by  a solemn 
commitment enshrined in the Treaty. 
The  worsening  in  budget  deficits  is  clearly  evident  in  Graph  I  which  shows  the 
developments of  government budget balances in the EU, the US and Japan. D.  c 
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Source: European Commission, DO li  database. 
The  governn1ent  budget  balance  for  the  EU  as  a  whole,  after  hovering  around 
equilibrium until the first  oil price shock,  deteriorated by 3 to 4% percentage points, 
and briefly registered a deficit under 3% of GDP  on only  two occasions in the past 
twenty years.  A sitnilar  structural break in budgetary behaviour also  occurred in  the 
other major economies in  the early  1970s,  but these countries were able  to quickly 
redress the situation to a large extent. 
The behaviour of the stock of public  debt  indicates that budgetary imbalances  have 
become structural during the past  two decades.  Table  1 presents the  change in  the 
public  debt to GDP  ratio  in  EU countries in  the  period  1970-96  during  periods of 
positive and negative output gaps. - 16-
Table 1:  Business cycle and public debt accumulation 1970-1996 
Change in debt/GDP  Change in debt/GDP  Public debt/GDP (o/o) 
in periods of  in periods of negative  at the end of 1996 
positiye output gap  output gap 
( 
0/o points)  (%points) 








UK  -30.0  4.5  54.8 
Partial offsetting in non-recession period>; 
FIN  -8.5  51.6  58.7 
s  -6.8  54.4  77.7 
-E  -0.3  54.3  69.6 
Debt accumulation also in non-recession period'l 
A  17.6  32.8  70.0 
B  8.0  58.3  130.0 
D  18.5  23.6  60.7 
DK  6.3  51.2  70.2 
EL  41.5  52.7  111.8 
F  9.2  26.5  56.2 
I  23.1  62.5  123.7 
IRL  3.5  1.9.5  72.8 
NL  5.7  31.2  78.5 
p  12.3  38.1  65.6 
Notes 
1.  The output gap is defmed as the difference between the ac.tual and trend GDP measured as a share of trend 
GDP. 
2.  Period 1977-96  for  F,  period 1975-96 for  NL and period 1973-96  for  P.  'The  build-up of debt in Fin and S 
during the  1991-93 recession is partly attributable to financial  operations and other factors  not atTecting  the 
deficit (the so-called stock-flow adjustment). 
Source 
European Commission, DG II database. 
The evidence shows that a large n1ajority of Member States continue to accumulate 
public debt even in periods characterised by above-trend grow1h.
15 
Therefore, the experience of  Europe in the last two decades strongly supports the view 
that budgetary policy did not follow the prescriptions of "tax s1noothing" theory. This 
allows fbr the accumulation of debt during recessions, but requires debt decumulation 
in periods of  high growth. Actual budgetary behaviour in Europe, far from confotming 
to  tax  smoothing,  indicates  that  fiscal  policies  have  tended  to  respond  to  various 
political factors, resulting in a deficit bias. 
16 
15  However, in two Nordic countries, if  past exl)erience is confirmed, one can confidently expect that 
the large debt accumulation in the 1991-93 crisis will be re-absorbed in the coming years. 
16  The recent literature on tl1c  "political econo1ny"  of b11dget  deficits is  Sllrve)red by Alesina and 
Perotti (1995) and Hahm et al. (1995). (4) 
-17-
The debt accumulation of  the past decades is not sustainable for several reasons.  First, 
the rise in dependency ratios, due to the ageing of  the population, will inevitably put a 
heavy burden on social spending in the years to cotne.
17  Second, several authors
18  have 
pointed out that, without fbrther tax harmonisation, the single currency, by reinforcing 
the effects of  the Sing]e Market, n1ay have a negative irnpact, especial1y on the revenue 
side  due  to increased  factor  n1obility  and  tax  competition.  Third,  the  loss  of the 
exchange rate instrument  in EMU vvill  increase  the importance  of fiscal  policy  for 
stabilisation purposes.  In addition, without credible budgetary consolidation,  existing 
high or still grovving debt ratios tend to increase interest rates by a risk premiurn and 
monetary  policy  is  overburdened,  both  of which  have  a  negative  effect  on  the 
investn1ent and the business clitnate. 
The EM[!  perspective 
While  the  case  tbr budgetary  discipline  from  a  purely  national  point  of vie'v  is  a 
powerfu] one, conunon discipline rules in El\t1U are first and foremost required because 
budgetary tnisbehaviour has systemic, EMlJ-wide implications. 
Excessive public finance imbalances impinge on the objective of ensuring an adequate 
macro-econontic policy mix.  Budgetary discipline is important in order to prevent the 
overburdening  of monetary  policy  in  tnaintaining  price  stability,  thereby  avoiding 
higher-than-needed interest rates. 
If public  debt  is  perceived  as  being  on an  unsustainable  course,  the  so1vency  of a 
government  n1ay  be  called  into  question.  In  such  a  case,  the  threat  of financial 
instability spreading across EMU n1ay result in pressures for various forms of bail out. 
Fiscal  bail  out  goes  via  pressure  for  direct  or  indirect  subsidies  by  the  errant 
govemrnent.  Monetary bail  out rnay  occur ex post,  through ntonetisation  of public 
debt, or ex ante, through the reluctance of  the central bank to raise interest rates in the 
face of  inflationary pressures. 
If a govemm.ent whose public debt is  held largely by the banking system  throughout 
EMU, faces a bankruptcy because of a reckless budgetary policy, financial instability 
could spread across the Union.  Pressure for ex post n1onetary bail out would put the 
ECB in a dilemma. because it would face  a trade-off between ensuring price stability 
and promoting a wel1 functioning payment system, as required by art.  1  05. 
The logic of  the Treaty is that the n1ere danger of  bail out requires budgetary discipline 
enforced  by  the  Union.  This  logic  is  not  universally  accepted.  For  instance, 
Eichengreen  and  von  IJagen  (1995)  argue  that  it  ignores  that  a  governntent 
experiencing a budgetary crisis is  able to raise taxes to service and redeetn its debts. 
However, this counter-argutnent may not apply to EU countries 'vhere tax pressure is 
already very high and tax competition a reality. 
17  See Franco and Mlmzi (1997). 
18  See Bovenberg et al., (1991), and Masson and Taylor (1993). - 18-
The independent status of the ECB,  discussed above,  goes a long way in appeasing 
bail-out fears of debt monetisation. However, there are strong arguments for believing 
that the  anti-inflationary reputation-building task of the newly-created  ECB  will  be 
greatly helped by sound initial and continuing budgetary positions of  EMU members. 
All  in all,  the deficit rule helps dispel concerns about the tnonetary-fiscal policy-mix, 
while the debt rule addresses the threat of  financial instability and inflationary pressures 
linked to unsustainable stocks of debt.  The deficit rule n1ay  also  prove necessary in 
order to Inaintain price stability. Without a deficit criterion, markets may anticipate a 
possible  inconsistency  between  monetary  and  fiscal  objectives,  thereby  forcing  the 
price level to adjust.  Such adjustment ,x..·ould  ensure that the present value of future 
budgetary surpluses is  equal or larger than the present stock of debt so as to ensure 
goveminent solvency.  Therefore, "the deficit criterion's inclusion in the Treaty ( ... ) is 
necessary for the 'functional independence' of  the central bank. Without it, the central 
bank would  not  be  capable  of controlling  the  price  level,  even  if it  had  political 
independence and a mandate for price stability" (Canzoneri and Diba, 1996, p.  1  ). 
How to  achieve and  1naintain  budgetary discipline? The Stability and  Growth 
Pact 
The Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact are the concrete 
EU  answer  to  the  budgetary  discipline  concern.  The  Excessive  Deficit  Procedure 
establishes  that  Member  States  shall  avoid  excessive  deficits  and  provides  two 
yardsticks for deficit  and  debt,  - namely  3~o and 60% of GDP,  respectively - on the 
basis of  which the budgetary positions of  the countries should be assessed. The way in 
which  general  principles  and  procedures  of the  Treaty  are  to  be  itnpletnented  is 
specified in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
The Pact, which was finally  adopted by the European Council in Amsterdam in June 
1997,  starts  by  recognising that,  in  order to respect the 3% deficit  ceiling  even in 
unfavourable economic circumstances, govermnent budgets should be close to balance 
or in surplus in the medium n1n, taking due account of  national differences. In order to 
strengthen the credibi1ity of the commitment to fiscal  discipline, budgetary monitoring 
before the 3~'0 deficit threshold is exceeded will be stepped up. :Furthermore, a precise 
definition of the "exceptional and  temporary conditions" of art.  1  04c(2) is  provided 
and time limits are set on the various steps of  the Excessive Deficit Procedure. Finally, 
the Pact specifies the type and scale of  sanctions to be applied to EMU ntembers with 
a persistent excessive deficit. 
A number of questions have been raised in relation to the framework for budgetary 
discipline underpinning the setting up of  EMU: 
a)  are  numerical  rules  the  most  effective  cotnmitment  device  to  ensure  budgetary 
discipline? 
b) what should be the criteria for selecting the medium-term budgetary target by EMU 
members, in the Jight of  the previous discussions on budgetary policy spillovers? - 19-
c)  how should the behaviour of :tv1ember  States adapt in  order to  confotm with  the 
Stability and Growth Pact requirements? 
Strict numerical rules as a co1nmitn1ent device 
Numerical budgetaty rules reflect a transatlantic consensus on the way to ensure fiscal 
prudence:  they have taken the form  of 1v1aastricht-type  deficit  and  debt  ceilings  in 
Europe and the bipartisan accord to balance the budget by the year 2002  in the US. 
An altetnative option discussed in the literature on ensuring budgetary discipline is the 
establishment of  procedural rules conducive to a responsible fiscal  behaviour.  They 
entail  various reforms of the budget process and  institutions.  Recent  literature has 
established that reforms  in this  area  can  indeed  be effective  in  curbing the "short-
termism" of  politicians
19
. 
The importance of effective budgetary procedures is recognised by the Treaty, which, 
in Protocol N° 5 on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, states that •'J\1enlber States shall 
ensure  that  national  procedures  in  the  budgetary  area  enable  them  to  meet  their 
obligations  in  this  area  deriving  frotn  this  Treaty".  Already  n1any  examples  of 
tightening  in  procedures,  such  as  more  rigorous  budgetary  control,  clearer 
arrangements between different levels of government, etc. have been introduced in the 
past several years.  The pressure to maintain budgetary discipline is likely to result in 
further institutional and procedural changes. 
Why  has  the EU opted  for  'common'  numerica)  rules,  confining  procedural  rules 
largely to the realm of  subsidiarity? 
Numerical targets with clear political visibility may be perceived as more effective in 
re-dressing public finance imbalances,  especial1y in the case of countries starting with 
very  substantial budgetary  disequilibria.  Indeed,  institutional  reforms  seen1  to be  a 
natural device to ensure the non-reversibility of  consolidation, rather than a trigger of a 
regime change.  Moreover, the adoption of harn1onised  budgetary procedures would 
have led to fundamental problents from the point of  view of  national sovereignty. Also, 
institutional reforms are more difficult  to monitor centrally,  cotnpared to nun1erical 
targets. 
Setting the mediurn-tenn national targets 
The Stability and Growth Pact leaves a certain flexibility to Member States in choosing 
their own medium-term budgetary objective. This is itnportant, given the different size 
of the automatic stabilisers in national economies,  as well as  other structural factors 
(such as the different itnpact of ageing on the public finances of  Member States). The 
19  The academic literature on budgetary refom1s was pioneered by von Hagen (1992) and has been 
recently surveyed by Alesina and Perotti (1996a, 1996b) and Corsetti and Roubini (1996). For an 
application to Community tv1ember States, see von Hagen and Harden ( 1.994)  and Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1995); Poterba (1996) has applied Uris approach Lo the US SLate govenllllents. -20-
Council vvill  have the task of assessing the coherence between the preferred national 
option and the general thrust of the Pact.  This  choice  n1ay  harbour sotne  potential 
conflicts. 
Monetary union members vvith relatively lnw debt are 1ike1y to put a strong accent on 
debt sustainability issues.  'These countries would, therefore, prefer a lower deficit the 
higher the debt - so as to reduce the risk of  potential financial instability - as a principle 
in the selection of  national medium-term targets. 
20 
By  contrast,  high  debt  1nen1bers  tnay  prefer less  ambitious budgetary objectives the 
higher the stock of debt. Two argutnents underpin tllis position. First of all,  as part of 
the interest burden actually represents compensation for the loss of real value of the 
debt eroded by inflation, identical levels ofnotninal budget deficit (as a share of GDP) 
correspond to lower real (inflation-adjusted) levels of deficit the higher the stock of 
debt.  Secondly,  the pri1nary  surplus consistent 'vith a given level  of budget balance 
depends positively on the stock of debt.  As a result,  an objective of lower deficit or 
higher surplus for countries \Vith high 1eve1s of  debt nmy entail disruptive consequences 
by  requiring  them  to  go  beyond  their  "politically  feasible  pritnary  surplus''  in 
Blanchard's definition (Blanchard, 1984). 
Implications of  the Stability and Growth Pact for the behaviour of  national budgetary 
authorities 
The Stability and Gro\vth Pact conunits l\1ember States to move to\va.rds a budgetary 
position of close to balance or in surplus to prevent budget deficits of EMU metnbers 
from exceeding the 3% ceiling. 
The  analysis  of budgetary  policies  of ElJ countries in  periods of severe  recession 
shows  that,  to  the  extent  that  past  behaviour  is  relevant  for  assessing  EMlJ 
developtnents,  a  roo1n  for  n1anoeuvre  of 30;o  points of GDP would  allow Member 
States to  overcome  most  periods  of economic  difficulties  without  running  into  an 
excessive detlcit position
21
.  Therefore, once the balanced-budget position js  attained, 
tlscal policy will generally have a sufficient degree of  flexibility for the implementation 
of effective stabilisation policies in EMU. However, in the early years of EMU, 1nost 
countries will still be in transition to a balanced budget. This points to the need for a 
suffi.ciently  rapid  convergence  by  EMU tnentbers  towards  the  medium  term  fiscal 
target in order to avoid excessive deficits in the event of  a cyclical downturn. 
20  The suggestion of allowing full  flexibility of budgetary policies for  debt ratios below the  60~1o 
reference value and reducing it progressively tor higher debt ratios is put forward by Eichengreen 
( 1997).  According to  this proposal. the implementation of procedural budgetary reforms should 
allow countries to "buy" flexibility in the implementation of  the Stability and Growth Pact during 
the early years of EMU. However. such a solution may run into problems if  the markets consider 
it  in conflict  with  the  'quasi-legal  system'  of Maastricht,  thereby  calling  into  question  the 
determination by member countries to stick to strict budgetary discipline while in EMU. 
21  For a  'retrospective' application of the Stability and Growth  Pact requirements,  see Buti  et  al. 
(1997). -25-
dift1cult for the ECB to rely heavily on n1onetary aggregates as interm.ediate targets in 
the conduct of  tnonetary policy  . 
.  Exchange rate policy 
Individual EU 1nen1ber states have generally been greatly concerned about fluctuations 
of the DM vis-a-vis the dollar.  The reason is  that important n1ovements in the DM-
dollar exchange rate tend to produce strains on intra-EU exchange rates. In particular, 
depreciations of  the dollar, have often been accon1panied by a weakening of  European 
currencies relative to the DM,  as was the case most recently in the Spring of 1995. 
Such currency turn1oil  have been detrimental to ElJ countries,  given their relatively 
stnall size and large degree of  openness. 
With the advent of EMU, participating EU countries ·will become relatively insulated 
from fluctuations in the dollar.  Nonetheless,  an attitude of "benign neglect" vis-a-vis 
the exchange rate of  the euro, an attitude long adopted by US authorities \Vith respect 
to the external value of the dollar,  may be neither feasible  nor desirable.  Begg et  al. 
( 1997)  argue that  a  pure flexible  exchange rate  systetn,  implying  "benign neglect'', 
would be inappropriate because of  the risk of  misalignn1ent. 
Impact on the external value of the euro 
l-Io\v wi11  the exchange rate of  the euro behave? There are two facets to this problem: 
strength and volatility. 
In the long run, two basic elements favour a strong euro. First, the ECB's comnlitn1ent 
to price stability and,  more generally, the macro-economic framework of El\tfU point 
to low interest rates and a strong currency. Second, as indicated previously, over titne 
the  euro  is  likely  to  substitute  partially  for  the  dollar,  thereby  raising  the  relative 
demand  for  euros  as  a  result  of both official  reserve  shifts  and  private  portfolio 
diversification. 
It~ the short term, however, there is uncertainty regarding the strength of  the euro. On 
one hand,  the European economy,  partly as  a result  of EMU,  is  likely to enjoy  an 
upsv.~ng leading  to  an  exchange  rate  appreciation.  On the  other,  the  international 
detnand for the euro is likely to be lower than for the combined underlying currencies. 
European central banks nlight wish to decrease their holdings in EU currencies, albeit 
very  gradually,  as  the  need  to  stabilise  intra-European  exchange  rates  will  largely 
disappear.  At  the  same  tim.e,  private  investors  wishing  to  n1aintain  the  degree  of 
diversification of  their potifolios would need to shift to non-EMU currencies. 
Many observers also expect a volatile euro exchange rate - see, for instance,  Benassy-
Quere  et  al.  (1997)  and  Cohen  (1997).  Their  prediction  is  largely  based  on  the 
assumption of  "benign neglect". The new preference of  European tnonetary authorities 
for domestic rather than external equilibriun1 is supposed to lead to increased exchange 
rate volatility. This link is challenged by Martin ( 1997) who finds evidence of a hump-
shaped relationship between country size and the variability of  the exchange rate.  This -26-
finding is consistent 'vith the view that a large country has 1ittle incentive in using the 
exchange rate strategically because the size of the traded goods sector is small.  This 
works in the direction of  less exchange rate volatility. Furthem1ore, allegedly easier co-
ordination among a  reduced  number of actors on the international  stage,  may  also 
reduce volatility. 
It should  be pointed  out,  however,  that the debate  on the  strenf,Jth  of the  euro  is 
somewhat misplaced.  A  policy mix involving  an acceleration in  supply-side reforms 
would help to reduce the counter-inflationary burden on monetary policy and provide 
the conditions for a strong economy and low interest rates, resulting in a sound but not 
overvalued single currency.  Conversely,  a poorly tnanaged economy can also  create 
periods of  artificially strong exchange rates. For example, an expansionary fiscal stance 
or inappropriately high wage settlentents in major parts of the euro zone would force 
the ECB into a tighter monetary stance (because of  actual inflationary tensions and the 
itnplications of  medium-term fiscal debt unsustainability for the credibility of  the ECB). 
The consequences of high interest rates could  be an - artificially  and  temporarily -
inflated euro exchange rate. 
IT.  ADJUSTMENT IN EMl.T 
In Er..ru,  all  members  will  share  the  san1e  n1onetary  policy,  regardless  of their 
individual economic circumstances. This potential constraint has been one of  the main 
subjects  of preoccupation  in the  literature  on El\1U.  If countries  are  affected  by 
idiosyncratic shocks or experience de-synchronised business cycles, giving up national 
tnonetary independence may prove costly. The potential cost depends on two factors: 
the likelihood of economic disturbances calling for n1onetary policy or exchange rate 
adjustment, and the availability of alternative adjustment channels. The analysis below 
argues that, already today, the nominal  exchange rate is  the pertinent instrument for 
adjustment only in a li1nited number of  cases. The new economic environment of  EMU 
will further reduce the frequency of cases where an exchange rate change may have 
been called tbr and  wi11  enhance alternative adjustment channels.  The literature may, 
therefore, have over-emphasised the costs of the loss of the exchange rate instrument 
in EMU. 
A.  'ECON.OMIC SHOCKS AND CYCL:ES 
Taxonomy 
Clearly,  shocks affecting all the economies of the tnonetary union in a similar fashion 
as well as synchronised cycles, do not call for a change in national parities. If  need be, 
the exchange rate of the  euro  vis-a-vis  third  cunencies,  \'{ill  adjust  to re-establish 
equilibriun1. 
26 Even the category of  asymn1etric disturbances i~, too wide from the point 
26  Shocks that are symmetric in origin may,  in the end,  t1arn  out to produce differentiated effects 
across men1ber co1mtries if transmission mechanisms or policy responses are different.  However, -27-
of vie·w  of assessing whether a change in  the exchange rate is  potentia.l1y  ca11ed  tor. 
The following classification should be considered: 
a)  country-specific versus sector-specific shocks and cycles. Only if a shock stops at 
the national boundaries or if cycles are clearly de-synchronised may the change in 
nonlinal exchange rate, which leads to  ... a n1odification of all  the prices relative to 
foreign competitors,  be  appropriate.  If asynnnetric  shocks essentially  concern a 
particular industry, the use of monetary policy would be wrong: "if the monetary 
authorities  induce  a  depreciation  of the  exchange  rate  in  order  to  assist  the 
particular industry(ies  ), the associated fall in interest rates could cause overheating 
in construction, and the rise in the price of  in1ported raw materials could datnage 
transportation and defence." (Melitz,  1996, p.  17). 
b)  real versus financial  shocks: even within the category of country-specific shocks, 
exchange rate changes may be desirable only if faced 'vith variations in aggregate 
demand,  while "nominal exchange rate flexibility  is  definitely  undesirable in the 
face of  domestic t1nancialtnarket shocks (say liquidity preference (money demand) 
or shocks to the dotnestic money supply process)" (Buiter,  1995,  p.25).  In such 
event, fixed  exchange rates allo'v n1oney to flow across national borders to meet 




c)  Temporarv  versus  permanent  shocks:  while  for  temporary  shocks  (essentially 
demand-related), the use of monetary policy may be  ~f  help to stabilise aggregate 
demand,  its use in the case of shocks having long-lasting efrects (mainly supply-
related) is far fron1 obvious. As permanent shocks call for "adjustn1ent" rather than 
"stabilisation"
28
,  the  use of the  exchange  rate  in  an  attetnpt  to  buy  titne,  tnay 
simply postpone the necessary factor reallocation. If, as evidence shows, structural 
change is already too slow in Europe com.pared to,  say,  the US,  slowing it down 
further through monetary cushioning tnay  be  exactly what policy  makers should 
want  to  avoid.  In  the  broad  category  of pem1anent  shocks,  differentials  in 
productivity growth between  mature  and  catching-up  economies  (the  so-called 
~'Balassa-Srunuelson" effect),  is  often  mentioned  as  an  argument  in  favour  of 
retaining the exchange rate instrutnent. However, as argued in  Section I-A,  such 
differentials, 'vhich operate only gradually over time,  can be accotnmodated with 
fixed exchange rates. 
d)  Exogenous versus policy-induced shocks:  an in1portant linlitation of most of the 
OCA literature is that it  treats economic  disturbances as  exogenous phenomena 
with which policy authorities are suddenly faced.  In reality, policy-induced shocks 
or shocks originating in  labour and  employer's unions counting on n1onetary  or 
in the new monetary and iiscal reginte, these differences will gradually fade (see Section I-A and 
point (d) below). 
27  The alleged ineffectiveness of monetary policy under fixed exchange rates in the simplest small 
country version of the Mundell-Fleming model can be read as a full insulation of fixed exchange 
rates from monetary disurrbances. 
28  See Melitz (1996). -28-
fiscal  bail  out,  are  probably  more  comtnon  than usually  reflected  in  the  OCA 
literature. Political business cycle n1odels  as well as  the literature on the political 
econotny of budget deficits surveyed in Section 1-B point to potential bias in the 
behaviour of  policy makers. Accordingly, EMU's stability framework - budgetary 
discipline  rules  as  well  as  independence of the  ECB
29 
- is  likely  to reduce  the 
likelihood of  policy-induced shocks. 
The above taxonomy indicates that the exchange rate instrument is potentially useful in 
rather  narrow  circumstances,  namely  in  the  events  of  disturbances  which  are 
sin1ultaneously country-specific, real and temporary. The probability of such event will 
be  even  smaller  in  EMU  given  the  new  econonlic  and  policy  framework:  trade 
integration will  further reduce the significance of national borders,  and  the stability-
oriented m.acro-econontic polides will curtail policy-induced shocks. 
Furthermore,  even in the remaining  cases vvhen  the exchange rate may have proved 
potentially useful, its optimal use may not be feasible in an environment of  high capital 
mobility  given  the  risks  of over-shooting  and  mis-alignment.  :rvfore  generally,  the 
experience  of monetary integration  in  Europe  indicates  that  perfect  exchange  rate 
flexibility  is  not the correct "anti-n1onde'' when discussing the costs and  benefits of 
EMU.  In particular,  the type  of econonlic  relationships  within  Europe  (nan1ely  the 
prevalence  of intra-industry  trade)  lead  to  devaluations  being  perceived  as  typical 
beggar-thy-neighbour policies, thereby rendering exchange rate tlexibility a non-viable 
option. 
E1npirical evidence 
As pointed out above, the exchange rate is a pertinent instrument for adjustment only 
in  a limited  sub-set of cases.  While conceptually this is  an  important conclusion,  the 
relevance and  relative frequency of "EMlJ-critical'  shocks boil down to an empirical 
question. A vast literature has sought to determine the nature of shocks undergone by 
EU members.  \Vhile  a n1ulti-faceted review is  beyond the scope of this  paper
30
,  the 
fo11owing indications seem to emerge iiom empirical analyses: 
i)  Studies suggest the existence of a nun1ber of EU countries with llighly correlated 
disturbances,  and  other  countries  showing  more  differentiated  economic 
behaviour. Several studies detect the existence of a "coren and a "periphery", but 
the cotnposition of the two groups varies a great deal across studies. l\tloreover, 
they are based on historical data and therefore essentially backward-looking. 
31 
ii)  A significant proportion of shocks is industry-specitlc,  as  shown by  Bini-Smaghi 
and Vori (1992)  and~ tnore  recently~ by Bayoutni and Prasad (1995). This finding 
holds for both sides of  the Atlantic. 
29  On the latter, sec the discussion in the section on monetary policy and the exchange rate below. 
3°  For a survey, see Melitz (1996). 
31  For a recent survey. see Beine (1997). -29-
iii)  The EU-\\~de plus region-specific components of shocks are important relative to 
the purely  national  component.  Analysing  changes in unentployment,  over the 
period 1971-93, Vifials and Jin1eno ( 1996) conclude that at the national level, the 
EU-wide  component  explains  over  half  of  the  variance  of  changes  in 
unemployment,  increasing to over  80o/o  over the medium term.  At  the regional 
level,  the  cotnbined  effect  of ElJ-wide  and  region-specific  shocks  account  for 
about 80% of  the variance of  regional unen1ployment rates. A sitnilar result can be 
found  in  Forni  and  Reichlin  (1997).  In  addition,  there  is  evidence  that  the 
correlation of regions across national borders has been increasing over time.  For 
instance,  "in  the  post-EMS  period,  northern  Italian  regions  display  higher 
correlations with German regions than ,,,.ith southern Italian regions" (Fatas,  1997, 
p. 749). 
iv)  Inferences based on pre-EMU observations ntay be highly misleading if, as argued, 
EMU amounts to a veritable regin1e  change.  A crucial question is the impact  o~ 
EMU on national specialisation, and on the likelihood of country-specific shocks. 
The literature holds two opposing views on this issue.  The first,  associated with 
Klugman  {1991,  1993),  claims  that  the  combination  of the  single  market  and 
EMU is  likely  to  increase  regional  specialisation  in  Europe,  implying  greater 
vulnerability to region-specific disturbances. However, even if  this scenario proved 
correct, it is far  from  obvious that 'regions' would coincide with 'nations', and 
therefore that 'national' specialisation would increase. The second view, based on 
en1pirical  findings  sho,ving  that  European  integration  tends  to  pron1ote  intra-
industry  trade  and  income  convergence,  holds  that  EMU  is  likely  to  reduce 
national specialisation and,  thereby,  ]ower the  vulnerability of Metnber States to 
idiosyncratic  disturbances. 
32  Frankel  and  R.ose  ( 1996)  find  evidence  consistent 
\vith the latter view and conclude that  a country is more likely to satisfy the OCA 
criteria for creating a monetary union ex post than ex ante. 
v)  According to Canzoneri et al. {1996), the exchange rate acts primarily as an asset 
price in the financial n1arkets, rather than responding as an absorption mechanism 
for goods markets disturbances, as assumed in the OCA.literature. Using quarterly 
data  front  1970  to  1985,  and  focusing  on  the  bilateral  relationships  between 
Germany  and  six  other EU  countties,  the  authors  find  that  'real'  supply  and 
detnand  shocks  explain over 90%  of the variation in  relative  output between a 
'extra-narrow' EMU composed of  Germany,  ~~ustria and the Netherlands and the 
other three countries (France,  Spain and the ·uK). 1-Io,vever, these shocks explain 
only  about 25% of the variations in the exchange rate.  Analogous results were 
found under a wider EMU including France. 
32  See European Commission (1996). -30-
B.  MARKET ADJUSTl\'IENT 
Labour and product ntarkets 
For the reasons indicated in  the previous section, it is improbable that the loss of the 
exchange rate instrun1ent will greatly affect the capacity of Member States to respond 
to shocks, at least in the medium to long run. This may even be the case in the shorter 
run,  provided  there  exist  alternative  adjustment  n1echanisms.  The  traditional  OCA 
literature has emphasised one such ntechanism,  namely labour market adjustment,  in 
the fonn of  wage flexibility and/or labour n1obiJity. 
Since EMU prevents changes in the nominal exchange rate as a means of  n1odifying the 
relative prices between countries, flexibility must be found elsewhere in the economy, 
namely in the adjustment of prices and wages. More precisely, what matters is cross-
country  relative  wage  flexibility  to  counter  country-specific  shocks.  If prices  and 
wages  are  sticky,  adjustment  will  occur  only  slowly  through  the  pressure  of 
unemployment on wage settlements. llowever, as stated in section 1-D, a stable macro-
economic environn1ent and the EMlJ "transparency shock" may help bring about the 
required wage flexibility. 
If full adjustment cannot take place via changes in  prices and wages, a high degree of 
labour mobility is  required to prevent a  surge in  unemployment.  The unfavourable 
con1parison of  the degree of  n1obility between Europe and the US is then often quoted 
as evidence that the forn1er is not an optimal currency area
33
. 
\Vhile in most of  the traditional OCA literature, wage flexibility and labour n1obility are 
presented as quasi-interchangeable, recent theoretical developn1ents have pointed out 
that these two channels play a very different role according to the degree of  persistence 
of shocks.  In  particular,  in  the  event of transitory  shocks,_  a  low degree of labour 
tnobility is beneficial because it prevents labour force drain: "temporary shocks call for 
stabilisation rather than adjustment. In the case of such shocks, corrective movements 
in  the terms of trade vvould  be helpful  ( ... ),  but movements  in productive factors, 
capital and labour, are exactly what we want to avoid" (Melitz,  1996, p.29). 
34 In the 
case of  permanent shocks, factor reallocation n1ay prove necessary. However, the use 
of  the exchange rate to alleviate such shocks tnay not be appropriate because it would 
risk delaying the inevitable structural adjustment. lVIore generally, Buiter (1995) points 
out that the type of cross-country ntobility vthich would make up for the loss of the 
exchange rate - strictly tetnporary, that is reversible - does not exist anywhere in the 
world.  Futhermore,  Canada  and  .Australia  are  exan1ples  of monetary  unions  'vith 
relatively low geographical labour mobility. 
Although the working of  the labour tnarket has been particularly stressed in the debate 
on E11U, what matters for econonlic adjust1nent is, more generally, flexibility of both 
33  Eichengreen (1993) points out that even geographical mobility within EU countries is much lower 
than mobility between lJS states. As shown by Decressin and Fatas (1995), while negative shocks 
spur labour mobility in the US, they lead in Europe to changes in activity rates. 
34  In addition, "excessive" labour mobility could make it more difficult to raise taxes for stabilisation 
purposes. -31-
product and  factor markets.  More cotnpetitive product markets  should  also  ensure 
that wage tlexibility translates into price flexibility and that profit margins adjust in the 
event of shocks.  Bayoumi and Thon1as  ( 1995) examine relative prices and  econonlic 
adjustment in the EU and the US. They interpret their results as meaning that the lower 
integration of product and factor markets in  the EU irnplies the need for a significant 
degree  of relative  price  flexibility  in  the  EU  in  order  to  adjust  to  econonlic 
disturbances.  According to the authors, "tnuch of this flexibility is currently provided 
by  adjustable nominal exchange rates.  The implication is  that,  without higher factor 
mobility,  introduction  of a  comnton  currency  in  the  European -union  could  cause 
significant economic disruption by  lin1iting  the flexibility  of relative prices."  (p. 124). 
Bayoutni and Thomas acknowledge that the cotnpletion of  the single market and EMU 
itself will promote the integration of product and factor markets in the Union, thereby 
reducing the need for  large movements in relative prices.  But integration is  likely to 
take time. 
Capital and credit markets 
Whereas the literature on monetary unions focuses prin1arily on governn1ent transfers 
and labour market flexibility as instruments of  adjustment in the event of shocks, it has 
recently been pointed out that financial  markets also play an  important role.  Financial 
tnarkets  can  contribute via  two  different  channels  in  smoothing  shocks.  First,  in  a 
n1onetary  union,  portfolios tend to contain assets  fron1  many  regions  of the  union, 
thereby providing a cushion in the event of asyn1metric shocks. Second, in a monetary 
union,  economic  agents  are  able  to draw from  a larger  pool  financial  resources  to 
stnooth demand. 
In Europe,  more  integrated  capital  and  credit  n1arkets  should  greatly  enhance  the 
capacity of:tv1em.ber States to respond to shocks, as is presently the case tor US states. 
Asdruabali et al.  ( 1996) find  that financial  n1arkets  play a much  larger role than the 
Federal government  as  channels  of interstate risk  sharing.  Their  study  decomposes 
incon1e  and  consumption  smoothing  into  three  components:  federal  transfers; 
adjusttnent via the  cross-ownership  of productive  assets,  facilitated  by  a  developed 
capital  tnarket;  and  adjusttnent  through  lending  and  borrowing  on  national  credit 
markets.  The authors show that,  over the  period  1963-90,  39~"0 of shocks to gross 
state product were smoothed by capital n1arkets, 23% by credit n1arkets and only 13% 
by the federal government. The remaining 25'% were not stnoothed. 
35 
At the 1noment,  European financial  markets  are  still  relatively  fragmented,  thereby 
reducing their capacity for inter-European risk sharing.  The introduction of the euro 
will profoundly modify the financial landscape.  As noted, inter alia.,  by McCauley and 
White  ( 1997),  the  introduction  of a  single  currency  will  greatly  reinforce  other 
catalysts for change in the financial sector, namely tecln1ological change and the Single 
35  Sorensen and Y  osha ( 1997)  claim that "the EC  may  have  to  provide  greater  inter-regional 
insurance  until  capital  markets  are  sufficiently  integrated  to  carry  out  this  role"  (p.  1  07). 
However, with a budgetary position close to balance or in surplus, as envisaged by  the Stability 
and Growth  Pact,  :tvlember  States  should  have  sufficient  room to resort to national  automatic 
stabilisers. -32-
!\.1arket  Programme.  The  upshot  Vvill  be  the  creation of a  large  and  liquid  single 
financialtnarket. The euro will rapidly lead to the integration of  the bond market. The 
resulting greater depth, breath and liquidity of  the euro bond market will greatly reduce 
the bias in the portfolios of  institutional investors towards home-country assets. At the 
same time,  the  euro \vill  raise  the  degree  of con1petition  in  the  credit  market.  By 
eliminating foreign exchange rate risk and converging interest rates, the single currency 
will increase the willingness of customers to look outside their don1estic market for 
bank credit. 
C.  l\'IACRO-ECONOMIC POLICY ADJUSTMENT 
The previous section analysed how n1arkets  need to adjust in  response to economic 
disturbances. Assuming that (son1e) markets 'vill continue to adjust slowly in E:MU due 
to rigidities,  there  may  be  a  role  for  macro-economic  policy  in  dealing  with  such 
disturbances.  0b'¥iously, the desirabm.ty and type of macro-economic policy response 
will  depend  on the  nature  of shocks,  in  particular whether they  are  temporary  or 
pennanent,  and  whether they  are  symmetric  or asymmetric.  If they  are temporary, 
n1acro-economic policy may be used in order to stabilise the level of  economic activity. 
If shocks  are  perm.anent,  they  require  structural  adjustment  rather  than  macro-
economic  policy.  Nonetheless~  since  structural  adjustment  n1ay  be  painful  and 
disruptive, and therefore politically difficult to implement, macro-economic policy may 
have an accompanying part to play.  This section therefore examines the objectives and 
instruments of  macro-economic policy in the context of  economic disturbances. 
Policy assignment 
As we have seen in Part I, in EMU, tnonetary policy will be centralised, whereas fiscal 
policy  will  remain  decentralised  between  countries.  This  institutional  dichotomy 
suggests a sin1ple  policy assignment rule for dealing with symmetric and asymmetric 
shocks:  centralised monetary policy should be used to respond to symmetric shocks, 
while decentralised fiscal policy should be used in response to asymmetric shocks. 
This general indication is subject to three qualifications: 
a) in the event of  a symmetric shock, if  the whole effect on economic activity is not 
fully  offset by  a  monetary  policy  reaction,  an  "automatic,'  response  of fiscal 
policy would occur in any case via the working of  built-in stabilisers; 
b) although n1onetary  policy will be aimed prin1arily  at ensuring price stability,  it 
may also be called to respond to country-specific shocks, to the extent that the 
latter affect economic activity "on average" in the EMU area.  This is  typically 
the case of a severe shock affecting a large ErvfU m.ember.  In such a case,  the 
monetary stance is likely to be too loose for certain countries and too tight for 
others, thereby requiring offsetting n1oves  (in opposite directions) in budgetary 
policies; -33-
c) govetnments wishing to engage in  macro-economic po1icy  management face  a 
problem in identifying the nature of disturbances. As noted by Melitz (1996, p. 
14), "shocks do not come labelled as ten1porary or permanent." Equally, they are 
not  designated  as  symmetric  or  asymmetric.  The  in1plication  is  that  policy 
authorities risk  appl)~ng the wrong instrument.  This problem is  not specific to 
monetary unions, however. 
Monetary policy and the exchange rate 
The primary objective of the ECB is price stability.  Monetary policy can be used as  an 
instrument for macro-economic adjustment provided that price stability is not jeopardised. 
Obviously,  any  shock  ]earling  to  an  acceleration  of economic  activity  may  increase 
inflationary pressure.  Tightening of monetary policy will  at the  same  time  stabilise  the 
economy  and  reduce  inflationary  pressures.  A  symmetric  shock  negatively  affecting 
economic activity - such as a general decline in  demand  - may require a relaxation of 
monetary conditions. In this case, a union-wide monetary expansion would stintulate the 
economy of the union in  the  short  term  and  help  it  reach  a  new equilibrium  less 
painfully and more quickly,  provided that inflation is not expected to accelerate.  The 
impact of  a monetary relaxation on long-term rates n1ay serve as a yardstick tbr inflationary 
expectations: as long as markets believe prices wi11  remain. stable, long tenn rates ~il] not 
rise. 
An interesting  result  of the literature  on central  bank independence  is  relevant  in  the 
stabilisation debate. It has been sho~n  that countries with a more independent central bank 
do not seen1 to suffer frotn a higher variability of growth and employn1ent (  Alesina and 
Summers, 1993). However, one would have expected that a conservative central banker a 
Ia Rogoff, by caring primarily about inflation, would be less willing to stabilise economic 
activity, thereby leading to a higher output variability.  A possib1e explanation for the 'free 
lunch independence' result is that a tnore independent central bank may be more effective at 
stabilisation than less independent banks whose moves may be more readily interpreted as 
signalling the acceptance of  higher inflation; as hinted above, another possibility is that an 
independent central bank wou1d  help  lower the uncertainty about the future  course of 
policy,  thereby reducing policy-induced  shocks and  increasing  de facto  the  stabilisation 
power of  monetary policy
36
. 
The sheer size of  the euro area implies that any change in the stance of  monetary policy will 
have a significant impact on the traded sectors in the countries outside the euro area, even 
though the traded sector of the euro area itself is relatively small.  All  other things being 
equal,  an expansionary monetary policy in EMU could induce a  depreciation of the 
euro and a gain in external competitiveness for the union at the expense of its foreign 
partners. 
37 Consequently, the use of monetary policy in response to economic shocks 
might risk creating conflicts between the union and its foreign partners to the extent 
36  The  two  explainatious  are  put  forward  by  Fischer  (  1995)  and  Alesina  and  Gatti  (1995), 
respectively. 
37  The analysis of monetary  conflict and co-ordination under flexible  exchange rates in a  game-
theoretic  framework  was  initiated by H.amada  in  the  mid  1970s.  See,  for  instance,  Hamada 
(1976). -34-
that  the  latter pursue similar objectives (e.g.  in  the  event of a world-wide boom or 
recession). 
Budgetary flexibility and co-ordination 
As pointed out in the section on policy assigrunent, in El\1U national budgetary policy 
will have a more important role for macro-economic stabilisation across the economic 
cycle  and  in  the  event  of asymmetric  shocks.  Budgetary  policy  needs  to  pursue  a 
twofold  ain1:  first,  petform  a  shock-absorption  function  at  the  national  level  and, 
second, allow the establishn1ent of an optimal budgetary stance at the EMU level.  In 
order to meet  the  first  objective,  a  degree  of flexibility  has  to  be  left  to  national 
budgets.  Meeting the second objective requires that the issue of budgetary policy co-
ordination be addressed. 
Budgetary policy  for macro-econo1nic stabilisation 
Preserving the necessary flexibility  to cope with adverse econonlic events requires  a 
sound budgetary discipline under normal economic circumstances so as to prevent the 
emergence ofunsustainable budgetary positions. The experience ofEU-Member States 
shows  that  substantial  budgetary  imbalances  have  gradually  frozen  the  use  of 
budgetary policy as an anti -cyclical tool. 
38 
An expansionary budgetary policy in  a monetary union member vvould  have a strong 
dotnestic  effect  because  (compared  to a  situation of floating  or managed  exchange 
rates) the crowding-out of  investtnent and exports, via the rise in interest rates and the 
appreciation of the euro,  would be smaller.  Symmetrically,  a budgetary restriction in 
individual countries may be ntore effective in dampening excessive demand.  Over titne, 
two opposing effects are likely to emerge: the application of the Stability and C'rrowth 
Pact, by leading to a progressive re-absorption of public debt, 'vill create tnore space 
for stabilisation policies; on the other hand, if  EMU leads to deeper trade integration, 
part of  the positive effect of  the budgetary boost 'vill spill over to partner economies. 
Acllieving a medium-term budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus creates 
n1ore  room for  automatic stabilisers to work.  Should  the latter be  supplemented by 
discretionary budgetary policies? 
While  in  case  of particularly  severe  econonlic  do,vnturns,  discretionary  budgetary 
action  cannot  be  ruled  out,  there  is  a  widespread  scepticism  in  the  economics 
profession  on  the  active  use  of budgetary  policy  for  stabilisation  purposes.  Mode] 
uncettainty~ risks of pro-cyclical behaviour due to cumberson1e parlian1entary approval 
and  itnpletnentation;  irreversibility  problems  caused  by  vested  interests;  supply  side 
inefficiencies linked to excessive volatility of tax rates:  all these arguments militate in 
favour  of rnaintaining  a  stable  medium-tetm  oriented  budgetary  policy,  thereby 
avoiding attempts to fine-tune the cycle through discretionary n1easures. 
38  See Buti et al. (1997). -35-
The co-ordination of  national budge  tal}' policies 
As stated above, in EMU, tnonetary policy will be conducted by a centralised body, the 
ECB,  while  budgetary  policy  will  remain  decentralised  between  countries.  This 
institutional  arrangement  has  a  bearing  in  the  event  of economic  shocks  requiring 
tnacro-economic stabilisation.  This situation may call for (a) the co-ordination an1ong 
national  fiscal  policies,  as  national  governments  may  pursue  inadequate  budgetary 
policies  due  to  e-x-ternalities  between n1ember  states; 
39  and/  or (b)  the  co-ordination 
between monetary and budgetruy policy as the policy-mix may be inappropriate due to 
spillovers between monetary and budgetary policy.
40 
In principle, stabilisation of a region or a country affected by a shock may not require 
co-ordination, provided that EMU members allow their automatic stabilisers to operate 
and that no  discretionary budgetary policy is  envisaged. 
41  This  would provide more 
budgetary offset against asynnnetric shocks than in the United States. 
42 
lf each tv1em.ber  State lets its  stabilisers work,  the system  should  have  a  substantia] 
degree of built-in  stabilisation against  cotnmon shocks  affecting the whole  EMlJ.  If 
autotnatic  tnechanisms  were  judged  insufficient,  the  added  stabilisation  could  be 
provided  by  supply-side  a.djustn1ent  and,  to  the  extent  that  price  stability  is  not 
endangered, by the ECB' s ntonetary policy. This response will dearly be more efiicient 
than decentralised n1onetary policies in the pre-EMU stage since the existence of the 
ECB will automatically solve the co-ordination problem among national central banks. 
Whether or not,  in  the event of a particularly severe negative contmon shock,  there 
might also be a need for budgetary expansion beyond auton1atic stabilisation is an open 
question.  If a  discretionary  "budgetary  supplement"  were  called  for,  each n1ember 
country might refrain from taking the initiative, hoping to free ride on other countries' 
stabilisation. This wait-and-see attitude might be cotnpounded by the fear that moving 
alone could bring forward the threat of sanctions under the Stability and C'Jfowth Pact 
arrangement. Policy co-ordination leading to a simultaneous budgetary expansion may, 
at least theoretically, be useful in this case if all the arguments against budgetary fine-
tuning could be overcome. 
43  Clearly, if such expansion were to happen, it would need 
to take into account the ECB' s policy so as to avoid negative feedback effects which 
could  lead  to  an  over-restrictive  tnonetary  stance.  Finally,  regardless  of whether 
budgetary policy were applied,  the use of monetary policy for  stabilisation purposes 
could need to be co-ordinated with foreign partners (in particular 'vithin the G-7) to 
avoid the potential "beggar-thy-neighbour' probletns referred to above. 
39  See Lamfalussy (1989). 
40  Under certain conditions. coordination of structural policies, including tax policies. may also be 
helpful. 
41  Sante member states may not agree to let automatic stabilisers operate fully ex ante. In such 
event, co-ordination may be required. 
42  Pisani-Ferry et al. (1993) find that the federal tax and transfer system in the United States absorbs 
only about 17% of  a regional shock compared to well over 30% in France and in Germany. 
43  The need for budgetary co-ordination in the case of severe syn1metric shocks is stressed by Allsop 
and Vines (1996). -36-
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